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Abstract: I answer Alvin Plantinga’s challenge to provide a ‘ proper’ de jure
objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection’
(SEO) concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justiﬁcation for
believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic
justiﬁcation in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee.
I defend philosophical interest in the SEO (and its underlying evidentialism) against
objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga’s criteria for a
proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of
‘ impulsional evidence’. I argue that no result from Plantinga-style Reformed
epistemology precludes the reasons I oﬀer in favour of giving the SEO its due
philosophical attention.

Introduction

There is a kind of objection concerning the epistemic rationality of
religious belief that has not been adequately rebutted, much less refuted. The
objection focuses on the evidence sophisticated religious believers possess with
respect to propositions that are central to a religious belief system. Here I restrict
my discussion primarily to Christian beliefs. Most Christians believe propositions
expressed by the following : ‘ God – the all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good
creator of the universe – exists’, ‘ Jesus of Nazareth was God incarnate ’, ‘Jesus
was resurrected after his death ’, ‘ I will live again after I die ’. Call such prop
ositions Christian propositions. The objection, which I call the sophisticates’
evidential objection (or, SEO), concludes that the total evidence possessed by
sophisticated Christians is not suﬃcient epistemically to justify their beliefs with
respect to Christian propositions.
Reformed epistemologists, such as Alvin Plantinga, have convinced many
philosophers that the kind of objection I mention fails to be ‘ proper’ (i.e. worthy
of philosophical interest) precisely because it concerns evidence. I argue that :
(1) Plantinga has not shown this, and (2) the SEO satisﬁes Plantinga’s own criteria
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for a proper de jure objection. My arguments address Plantinga’s criteria for a
proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of
‘impulsional evidence’. I conclude with a response to the ‘so-what ? objection ’,
according to which, even if all I have said is correct there is still no reason for
sophisticated Christians to be troubled. My overarching conclusion is not that the
SEO proves its conclusion, but rather that nothing from Plantinga-style Reformed
epistemology gives us good reason not to take it seriously : it is a proper de jure
objection.
Presuppositions of the SEO

The presuppositions of the kind of objection I have in mind are partly
motivated by the following idea: many contemporary epistemologists, including
Plantinga, analyse epistemic concepts in support of the common-sense, nonsceptical view that we have a lot of knowledge on the basis of sense perception,
introspection, rational insight, reasoning, memory, and testimony. Accordingly,
there is much agreement concerning examples of epistemically justiﬁed (and
unjustiﬁed) belief. For instance, it is agreed that typical sensory beliefs concern
ing medium-size objects at close range are justiﬁed ; so, if a theory implies that
such beliefs are typically not justiﬁed, then that result is taken as a reason to deny
the theory. Likewise, if a theory implies that human beliefs formed on the basis of
tea leaf reading (or clairvoyance, or reading the stars) are routinely justiﬁed, or
that the typical sensory beliefs of six-year-olds are unjustiﬁed, then such results
are taken to be reasons to deny the theory. My project ﬁts within this tradition
(call it the non-sceptical tradition).
My guiding principle is that any SEO worth taking seriously will rely on a theory
of epistemic justiﬁcation that, from the perspective of the non-sceptical tradition,
plausibly gets the correct results in all the uncontroversial cases concerning
epistemically justiﬁed (and unjustiﬁed) doxastic attitudes ; furthermore, that a
theory of justiﬁcation plausibly gets all the uncontroversial examples right is a
fact that provides substantial motivation for the theory. Finally, I assume that the
following principle is entirely reasonable : for any substantially motivated theory
T, unless there is an argument, utilizing non-partisan reasons, showing that T is
explanatorily worse than another substantially motivated theory, T is properly
motivated and thus worthy of philosophical interest. In what follows, (i) I defend
a substantially motivated theory of epistemic justiﬁcation against objections from
Reformed epistemology, and (ii) I argue that the theory, together with additional
facts about sophisticated religious believers, provides reason to think that the
SEO itself is worthy of philosophical interest.
The theory I have in mind is in the spirit of the well-known evidentialist view of
epistemic justiﬁcation (hereafter, ‘justiﬁcation ’) developed by Richard Feldman
and Earl Conee. Some notable presuppositions of the theory are as follows : ﬁrst,
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the justiﬁcation at issue is propositional justiﬁcation rather than doxastic justiﬁ
cation.1 Second, the justiﬁcation at issue is synchronic, having to do with what
one’s total evidence at a particular time indicates. Third, the SEO assumes that
justiﬁcation comes in degrees ; thus, it is consistent with the popular view that a
high degree of justiﬁcation is – when added to true belief and the satisfaction of a
Gettier condition – suﬃcient for knowledge.
Fourth, although there are various standards of epistemic justiﬁcation we
might consider, the SEO concerns only a modest standard : an on-balance, pre
ponderance-of-evidence standard. Accordingly, the belief attitude toward a prop
osition is justiﬁed for one at time t only if one’s total evidence at t, on balance,
indicates the truth of the proposition. Likewise, the disbelief attitude is justiﬁed
only if one’s total evidence indicates the falsity of the proposition ; and the
suspension-of-judgement attitude is justiﬁed only if one’s total evidence indicates
the truth of the proposition to roughly the same extent that it indicates the falsity
of the proposition. Hence, to believe p when one’s total evidence indicates the
falsity of p, or when one’s total evidence indicates the falsity of p to roughly
the same extent that it indicates the truth of p, is to believe against one’s evidence
(or, what doesn’t ﬁt with one’s evidence).
Fifth, the SEO assumes a version of modest foundationalism about justiﬁcation,
where the justiﬁcation at issue depends essentially on something mental that can
plausibly be understood as a reason to believe. Because it is anti-sceptical and
assumes modest foundationalism about justiﬁcation, the SEO is consistent with
the view that psychologically basic (i.e. non-inferred) beliefs – with respect to
external world propositions (e.g. ‘that is a tree ’), memory propositions (e.g. ‘ I had
coﬀee for breakfast ’), and rational insight propositions (e.g. ‘ every golden trum
pet is a trumpet ’) that are believed immediately as a response to experience – can
be, and often are, justiﬁed.
Sixth, ‘sophisticated Christians ’ is taken to mean those Christians who are
(i) smart, reﬂective, and well-educated ; (ii) aware of the problem of evil, facts
about religious diversity, and various arguments that count against the truth of
Christian propositions ; and (iii) aware of many very smart people who either
suspend judgement on or disbelieve Christian propositions.2
The SEO assumes what I call the ‘ evidence-justiﬁcation principle ’ :
evidence-justiﬁcation principle If a person S is epistemically justiﬁed
in believing a proposition p at time t, then S’s total evidence supports
p at t and fails to support yp at t.3
The evidence-justiﬁcation principle is entailed by what I take to specify the central
idea of synchronic epistemic evidentialism (call it ‘ general evidentialism’ or ‘ GE’) :
general evidentialism (GE) S is epistemically justiﬁed in believing a
proposition p at time t iﬀ p is supported by S’s total evidence at t.4
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The SEO, then, is consistent with, and motivated by, the traditional view that
having evidence is of great epistemic importance.5
By the ‘ evidence’ required for justiﬁcation, I am thinking of the ‘mentalism ’
(or, ‘ mind internalism ’) endorsed by Conee and Feldman (2004), according to
which all the factors that contribute to justiﬁcation are in a person’s mind.6
Evidence consists only of mental states, events, and conditions that are indi
cations of truth. The SEO assumes what can usefully be termed long evidence,
which construes the evidence one possesses broadly and deeply : all experiences
that plausibly indicate truths count as evidence.7 Accordingly, one’s evidence at a
time includes one’s perceptual experiences, introspective experiences, memorial
experiences, ‘seeing-the-truth ’ experiences, reasoning experiences, and any
other kinds of mental experiences that plausibly indicate truths, as well as stored
experiences that fall under any of the categories listed above.8 One’s ‘ total evi
dence ’ consists of all one’s occurrent and stored long evidence.
These suppositions taken together (with a few others to be discussed) consti
tute the view I will refer to as long evidentialism. It is intended not to be novel,
but to reﬂect (from the perspective of the non-sceptical tradition) our un
controversial judgements about examples of justiﬁed (and unjustiﬁed) belief. It is
thus substantially motivated and at least prima facie plausible as properly motiv
ated. Later, I provide positive reasons to think that the SEO is worthy of interest ;
but, ﬁrst, I do some ground clearing pertaining to work from Reformed epis
temology, for some of it calls into question my claim that long evidentialism is
properly motivated.
Responses from Plantinga-style reformed epistemology

The work of Reformed epistemologists such as Plantinga suggests that
any objection along the line of the SEO is misguided or irrelevant. Plantinga has
argued that one’s having evidence with respect to a proposition p is not necessary
for one’s being epistemically justiﬁed in believing p, and that one’s having evi
dence with respect to p is irrelevant or unnecessary for one’s belief that p to be
epistemically rational. Plantinga has typically drawn such conclusions on the
basis of objections to what he calls ‘evidentialism ’, and he has provided many
negative critical assessments of the views of a wide variety of well-known epis
temologists who think of themselves as evidentialists. This pattern gets an update
in his mature Warranted Christian Belief [hereafter, WCB or (2000)] where
Plantinga argues that the only proper objection to the rationality of religious
belief is the ‘ Freud & Marx objection ’ (which does not call into question the
evidence religious believers have). Given these data, and the fact that Plantinga
is the central ﬁgure in Reformed epistemology, it seems that the basic thrust
of Reformed epistemology’s response to the SEO would be this : the ob
jection assumes a central tenet of evidentialism (i.e. the evidence-justiﬁcation
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principle) ; but, one’s having evidence is either (a) unnecessary for one to be
epistemically justiﬁed in believing p, or (b) inessential to whether one’s doxastic
attitude toward p is rational ; hence, the objection fails to reveal any problem for
sophisticated Christians.
There are subtle taxonomic details to sort through. A clever Reformed epis
temologist might exploit such subtleties to deny both (a) and (b) above ; for in
stance, one might use Plantinga’s notion of ‘impulsional evidence’ – together
with insights from Norman Kretzmann’s compelling argument that Plantinga’s
anti-evidentialist arguments apply only to narrow, implausible construals of
evidentialism – in order to argue that Plantinga is an evidentialist !9 But, as I argue
in the section on ‘ Plantingan evidentialism ’, a Plantinga-motivated evidentialism
is far too epistemically anaemic to block the force of the SEO or show that it is
improper.
Plantinga’s project in Warranted Christian Belief

Plantinga’s goal in WCB is to show how it is possible for Christian belief to
be epistemically rational. He argues that the ‘ extended a/c model ’ reveals that it
is epistemically possible for Christian beliefs to satisfy the conditions of his own
theory of epistemic warrant.10 He seeks to motivate our interest in his theory by
arguing that the only proper de jure objection calls into question the Plantingan
warrant of Christian belief. In its broadest form, the de jure objection goes like
this : whether Christian beliefs are true or false, such beliefs are ‘ irrational or
unreasonable or unjustiﬁed or in some other way properly subject to invidious
epistemic criticism ’ (Plantinga (2000), 167). Plantinga whittles away various par
ticular de jure objections, settling ﬁnally on what he takes to be the only proper
one (i.e. the Freud & Marx objection).11 He then argues that any version of that
objection assumes the falsity of Christian beliefs. If he is successful, then since
what he calls a ‘ de facto objection ’ assumes that Christian belief is false, Plantinga
will have shown that there is no proper de jure challenge that is independent of a
de facto challenge.12 The relevant result is that there is no cogent de jure objection
at all. This implies that the SEO is also no good.
Plantinga on de jure objections

Well before the publication of WCB, William Alston (1995), 68–69, revealed
the implausibility of thinking that there is only one proper de jure objection.
Undaunted by the criticism, Plantinga devised in WCB a slightly new strategy for
convincing us : ﬁrst, count as ‘improper ’ any de jure objection that has some of
the following properties: lacking viability (Plantinga (2000), 169), lacking sensi
bility (ibid.), being trivial (ibid., 137), and not being relevant (ibid.);13 second, trot
out several de jure objections and argue that they are easily refuted or possess
some of the improper-making properties ; third, leave showing the improperness
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of any other de jure objections as homework for the rest of us (ibid., 104); and
fourth, conclude that the Freud & Marx objection is the only proper de jure ob
jection.
Although WCB has many excellent qualities, the strategy Plantinga uses to
motivate our interest in his epistemic theory is not among them. The fourth step
is especially puzzling in light of his claim that the Freud & Marx objection is futile :
‘We can … see the futility of the [Freud & Marx] complaint ’, he says, ‘ once we see
how theistic belief might have warrant’ (Plantinga (2000), 168). But, an objec
tion’s being futile surely sounds as bad as the other improper-making properties.
So why favour the Freud & Marx objection ?
Although I ﬁnd no good reason to privilege the Freud & Marx objection,
Plantinga has a practical reason to do so, since that objection happens to be the
very one for which his own theory of warrant is relevant. But, from the fact that
someone has a practical reason to privilege an objection, it does not follow that
we have an epistemic reason to do so. Even if taking a lot of eﬀort to rebut is
required for something to be a proper de jure objection, the SEO suﬃces.14 Lest
we draw this conclusion hastily, let us consider Plantinga’s arguments for the
conclusion that there is no proper evidentialist objection to the epistemic justi
ﬁcation of Christian belief.
Plantinga on evidentialism and epistemic justiﬁcation

In WCB (as elsewhere) Plantinga’s commentary on epistemic justiﬁcation
focuses on what he calls the ‘ classical picture ’, which is comprised of three
elements: a deontological view of epistemic justiﬁcation, evidentialism, and
classical foundationalism.15 Plantinga construes ‘ evidentialism ’ such that some
thing counts as a person S’s evidence E with respect to a proposition p only if E is
propositional and is relied on explicitly by S in an inference. And he claims that
evidentialism just is a deontological theory (having to do with praiseworthiness
and blameworthiness) that gets its rationale from classical foundationalism.
Although there are examples of such views, the long evidentialism implicit
in the SEO is not among them. As I have said, long evidentialism is a modest
foundationalist view. Since it is an evidentialist view, it entails that there is evi
dence in all cases of justiﬁed basic belief ; hence, given our anti-sceptical as
sumption, long evidentialism implies that there are justiﬁed basic beliefs which
do not get their justiﬁcation via psychological inference from other believed
propositions. Furthermore, long evidentialism does not get its rationale from
deontological considerations having to do with praise and blame; indeed, I am
convinced that there is no good argument from that kind of deontology to epis
temic internalism (of which long evidentialism is a species).16 From what, then,
does long evidentialism get its rationale ? It gets it (in part) from the fact that it
does better than any other theory at preserving all the uncontroversial judge
ments that are part of the non-sceptical tradition. Although I will not argue for
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that conclusion here, I will defend long evidentialism against Plantinga’s anti
evidentialist arguments.
Since long evidentialism is not a theory that falls under the ‘ classical picture’,
the SEO is immune to all of Plantinga’s arguments that trade on a deontological
notion of epistemic justiﬁcation, or classical foundationalism, or Plantinga’s
construal of ‘evidentialism ’. Indeed, only one passage in WCB so much as sug
gests an objection applicable to long evidentialism :
Consider memory. You remember what you had for lunch: lentil soup and a
doughnut. This belief isn’t based on propositional evidence. You don’t infer it from
other things you know or believe, such things, perhaps, as your knowledge that you
always have a doughnut and lentil soup for lunch, or your knowledge that it is now
shortly after lunchtime and there are doughnut crumbs on your desk and an empty
plastic soup dish in your trash. … But it also isn’t based on an experience. At any rate,
it is clear that memory beliefs are not based on anything like sensuous experience or
phenomenal imagery. There may be a bit of such imagery present (a fragmentary and
partial image of a doughnut or a bowl, perhaps), but you certainly don’t form the belief
on the basis of that image. It is clear that you could remember without having that
imagery – or, indeed, any other imagery. So the imagery isn’t necessary. It is also
insuﬃcient; you could also have that imagery without remembering. The reason is
that the imagery that goes with imagining that you had a doughnut and lentil soup for
lunch, or entertaining the proposition that you did, is indistinguishable (at least in my
own case) from the imagery that goes with remembering that you had a doughnut and
lentil soup for lunch. And even if you do have fairly explicit phenomenal imagery in
connection with this memory, you surely don’t know that it was lentil soup on the
basis of that imagery; the image isn’t nearly clear, detailed, and explicit enough to
enable you to distinguish it from, for example, imagery of pea soup, or bean soup, or
many other kinds of soup. (Plantinga (2000), 105–106)

To his familiar (and, I think, correct) point that we do not typically form a
memory belief via a conscious inference from propositions about how things
seem to us, Plantinga here adds a stronger claim : ‘ But it also isn’t based on an
experience ’ (ibid.). This gives us the seed of an objection even to the
general version of evidentialism : if there are epistemically rational beliefs that are
not related in any epistemic way to an experience, then there is no principled
reason for maintaining that all epistemically justiﬁed beliefs are supported by
evidence.
However, Plantinga does not really think that there are any epistemically
rational beliefs disconnected from experience. Notice the qualiﬁcation : ‘ At any
rate, it is clear that memory beliefs are not based on anything like sensuous ex
perience or phenomenal imagery ’ (ibid., 106). Let us take care: it is one thing to
say that a memory belief is not based on an experience, but it is another thing to
say that a memory belief is not based on sensuous experience or phenomenal
imagery. It may be that epistemically rational memory and a priori beliefs need
not be based on sensuous experience or phenomenal imagery, but Plantinga does
not show, nor does he believe, that experience plays no role in determining the
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epistemic status of memory and a priori beliefs. To clarify, consider one more
passage where Plantinga compares religious beliefs to memory beliefs and a
priori beliefs:
In a certain sense, there isn’t anything to go on in any of the three cases. You don’t
accept memory and obvious a priori beliefs on the basis of other beliefs; but you also
lack the detailed phenomenological basis, the rich and highly articulated sensuous
imagery that is involved in perception. What you do have in all three cases is another
kind of phenomenal evidence, what I have been calling doxastic evidence. (In WPF I
called it impulsional evidence.) There is a certain kind of phenomenology that
distinguishes entertaining a proposition you believe from one you do not: the former
simply seems right, correct, natural, approved–the experience isn’t easy to describe
(WPF, 190ﬀ.) You have this doxastic evidence in all three sorts of cases (as, indeed, in
any case of belief), and you have nothing else to go on. But you don’t need anything else
to go on : it is not as if things would be better, from an epistemic point of view, if you
believed, say, 2+1=3 or that you had oatmeal for breakfast this morning on the
evidential basis of other propositions, or on the basis of some kind of sensuous
imagery more or less like that involved in perception. (Plantinga (2000), 264)

Based on this passage, a case against GE and long evidentialism might go as
follows : with respect to perceptual beliefs such as visual beliefs, there is the
presence of experiential evidence in the form of phenomenal qualities : things
looking a certain way to you can legitimately be construed as supporting evidence
for your visual beliefs ; however, in the case of memory and a priori beliefs, there
need be no such thing as the way things look to you (e.g. no images) that play a
role in your forming the beliefs that you do; hence, you have no evidence for
memory beliefs and a priori beliefs.
However, if this were taken to be an objection to GE or long evidentialism, then
it would fail. From the fact that no highly articulated sensuous imagery is present
with respect to an intuitively justiﬁed believed proposition, it does not follow that
there is no evidence. Consider an elementary a priori belief formed as a response
to an experience that is sometimes described as ‘ seeing the truth ’. It is very
plausible that such an experience is characterized by awareness of the truthmaking constituents of the relevant proposition and relations among those con
stituents.17 So, it is very plausible that having the peculiar experience constituting
‘seeing the truth ’ just is good evidence for the proposition believed.
Something similar goes for occurrent memory beliefs, which are formed as a
response to memorial experience : whether or not the experience includes sen
sory imagery, it surely has a looking-back-in-time quality to it, for, if it lacked
such a quality, it would not give rise to what qualiﬁes as an occurrent memory
belief.18 Furthermore, the experience represents some particular state of aﬀairs
rather than others. The looking-back-in-time quality and the representative
content involved are plausibly evidence for something’s having occurred in the
past; for, that kind of experience just is the kind that indicates something’s having
happened in the past. Such justiﬁcation is defeasible, but unless it is defeated by
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other evidence one possesses, it is plausible that the peculiar experience that goes
with remembering just is a good reason (i.e. good evidence) for the relevant
proposition believed.
I conclude that reﬂection on the passage reveals nothing to impugn long evi
dentialism. In every instance of an epistemically rational belief that Plantinga
discusses, there is some experience that serves as the ground or basis or trigger for
that belief. Moreover, in every uncontroversial case of epistemically rational be
lief, there is an experience (or set of experiences) that can plausibly be regarded as
indicating the truth of the proposition believed. So, nothing along the lines under
discussion provides reason to deny long evidentialism. These considerations
may help to explain Norman Kretzmann’s claim that, were it not for Plantinga’s
‘ artiﬁcially narrow notion of evidence when characterizing evidentialism or his
own position … he would not be an anti-evidentialist ’ (Kretzmann (1992), 24).

Plantingan evidentialism

Might we argue against the SEO by adapting some of Plantinga’s epistemic
views into an evidentialist framework amenable to long evidentialism ? In par
ticular, can we get a Plantingan understanding of the evidence that long evi
dentialism appeals to in order to argue that sophisticates’ Christian beliefs are
typically justiﬁed ? Two ideas come to mind: Plantinga’s proper functionalism
and what he calls ‘ impulsional evidence ’.
Evidentialism and proper function

Although we cannot easily understand the supports relation mentioned in
GE in terms of proper function (since GE pertains to propositional justiﬁcation),
perhaps we can understand, in terms of proper function, a long-evidentialist
friendly relation involved in doxastic justiﬁcation. In one place Feldman & Conee
(2004, 83) characterize evidentialism as follows : ‘ Doxastic attitude D toward
proposition p is epistemically justiﬁed for S at t if and only if having D toward p
ﬁts the evidence S has at t ’. Perhaps the epistemic ﬁttingness appealed to can be
explained in terms of proper function. As I have said, Plantinga thinks that, in
every case of epistemically rational belief, there is an experience that serves as
a ground or basis or trigger for that belief. The epistemic ﬁttingness under
discussion works nicely when we consider the experience to involve a
non-inferential mental state that very plausibly indicates the truth of a proposition
due to the fact that it pretty closely reﬂects or mirrors the relevant proposition :
intuitively, a hand-like visual experience indicates that ‘that is a hand ’ ; a voice-like
auditory experience indicates that ‘ someone is talking ’ ; a looking-back-in-time
experience of a certain sort indicates that ‘I had coﬀee for breakfast ’ ; a certain
seeing-the-truth experience indicates that ‘2+3=5 ’, etc.19 There is some
plausibility in thinking that we are exhibiting epistemic proper function in
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these cases when we form the relevant beliefs on the basis of the evidence
described.
The trouble is that Plantinga claims that some experiences serve as the causal
triggers for rational beliefs when those experiences do not closely reﬂect or mirror
the relevant proposition. For instance, Plantinga says that one’s experience of
looking at a lovely ﬂower can trigger the sensus divinitatis to produce a belief such
as ‘ God made all this’. The experience is of a ﬂower, not of God ; but, the belief is
about God. Plantinga has done an admirable job of explaining how it is possible
for that belief to be the result of proper function, but it does not follow that the
belief ﬁts the evidence at issue (by hypothesis, the ﬂower-experience doesn’t look
like God).20 What seems entirely natural is that beliefs with respect to proposi
tions such as ‘ that is a ﬂower ’ ﬁt the evidence, because it is plausible that the
evidence is an indication of the truth of such propositions. But, it seems ad hoc to
think that such evidence indicates the truth of the theistic proposition.
I am open to the possibility that the doxastic epistemic ﬁttingness relation can
be understood in terms of proper function, but it seems to me that any plausible
view along that line will deny that an experience’s mere triggering of a belief,
even when the proposition believed is true, and even when it is caused by a
reliable belief-producing mechanism, counts as an indication to the person that
the proposition believed is true. But, what counts as an indication of truth to
the person just is what the evidential supports relation pertains to, and this is a
nonnegotiable component of long evidentialism. This is no objectionably dog
matic point, since it is Plantinga’s judgement of the example that is controversial.
So, unless there is some good reason to think that the mental experience as of,
say, seeing a ﬂower is itself an indication of the truth of a theistic proposition,
there seems to be little hope of adapting Plantinga’s particular views about proper
function to long evidentialism in a way that shows that the SEO fails.21
Evidentialism and ‘ impulsional evidence ’

As the quotation above indicates, Plantinga says that there is ‘ impulsional
evidence’ in all cases of belief. Perhaps reﬂection on this fact shows that the SEO
is not worthy of attention. Saying that the impulsional evidence for a sensory,
memorial, or a priori proposition makes the proposition seem right, Plantinga
claims that such evidence is good enough for belief, from the epistemic point of
view; indeed, he says you don’t need anything else to go on. One might think,
then, that this result lends support to long evidentialism ;22 moreover, because
there is impulsional evidence in all cases of belief, and sophisticated Christians
have lots of Christian beliefs, one might claim that Christian propositions are
supported by such evidence.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt that ‘ impulsional evidence’ actually
does any interesting evidential work. One reason concerns the nature of impul
sional evidence. In Warrant and Proper Function (1993a) – where Plantinga
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discusses in detail the relation between seeing the truth of a proposition (e.g. ‘ if
Sam is happy, then someone is happy ’) and impulsional evidence – he writes :
You see that the proposition is true: and that involves an inclination or impulse toward
believing the proposition–an inclination that is either experienced or such that it can
be brought to consciousness by paying attention to it. Perhaps we should say instead
that the proposition in question has a sort of attractiveness, or perhaps inevitableness
about it, or perhaps a sort of perceived ﬁttingness; the phenomenology is hard to
describe, but familiar to us all. (Plantinga (1993a), 191)

Although the impulsion to believe may be stronger with respect to obvious a
priori beliefs than with other kinds of belief, the general idea is supposed to apply
in all cases of belief : (1) one’s impulsion to believe (i.e. the experience of the
impulse alone) causes the proposition to seem true to one ; thus, (2) ‘ impulsional
evidence’ is evidence for the proposition believed.
But, the inference from (1) to (2) is doubtful. Note ﬁrst that feeling impelled to
believe a proposition is not always epistemic. A proposition such as ‘ everything
will turn out all right ’ may be so attractive to a person in a desperate situ
ation – because it is reassuring – that the person feels impelled to believe it. But
its being reassuring does not itself provide any epistemic reason to believe the
proposition. An epistemic reason to believe a proposition just is an indication
that the proposition is true. The desperate-situation example shows that one may
feel impelled to believe a proposition even if one has no epistemic reason to
believe it. So, if one does have an epistemic reason to believe a proposition, that
reason is something other than the impulsion to believe. The upshot is that an
impulsion to believe is not itself evidence.
Second, reﬂection suggests that Plantinga has backward the explanatory re
lation between seeing the truth and feeling impelled to believe. One doesn’t see
the truth of a proposition because (in part) one feels impelled to believe it, but
rather one feels impelled to believe the proposition because one sees its truth.
Seeing that a proposition is true surely counts as an epistemic reason for believ
ing the proposition, since the experience of seeing the truth of a proposition
indicates to one that it is true, but feeling impelled to believe is, by itself, no
epistemic reason at all for believing the proposition.23 Similarly, one’s having
a visual experience as of a tree might cause one to feel impelled to believe
that ‘ that is a tree ’, but for the same reasons as mentioned above, it does not
follow, nor is it plausible, that the feeling of impulsion itself indicates that ‘ that is
a tree’.
In any case, the fact that there is ‘impulsional evidence’ in all instances of
belief – no matter how irrational – reveals that having impulsional evidence is far
too anaemic to do much epistemological work. Furthermore, reﬂection on the
ubiquitous nature of ‘ impulsional evidence ’ reveals that any evidentialist view
taking ‘ impulsional evidence’ to be suﬃcient for justiﬁcation runs foul of the
non-sceptical tradition, which has its plausibility in part because it acknowledges
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that not all beliefs are justiﬁed. I conclude that facts about ‘ impulsional evidence’
provide no reason to think that Plantinga’s views aﬀord us plausible ways to use
long evidentialism against the SEO.
Does the SEO assume that Christian propositions are false ?

In WCB, Plantinga says that there is no proper de jure objection that does
not assume the falsity of theistic belief: ‘ There aren’t any de jure criticisms that
are sensible when conjoined with the truth of theistic belief; all of them either fail
right from the start … or else really presuppose that theism is false ’ (Plantinga
(2000), 191). Is the SEO committed to the falsity of theism or Christianity ? No. I can
demonstrate this by commenting on WCB’s overarching argument, which is as
follows : if the main lines of Christianity are true, then God would want persons to
have warranted beliefs with respect to Christian propositions ; and, if the conse
quent of the previous sentence is true, then very probably paradigmatic Christian
beliefs are warranted ; so, if the main lines of Christianity are true, then very
probably paradigmatic Christian beliefs are warranted (and thus epistemically
rational). In a structurally identical argument applied to the kind of epistemic
justiﬁcation at issue in the SEO, the ﬁrst premise would be this: If the main lines
of Christianity are true, then God would want persons to have epistemically justi
ﬁed beliefs with respect to Christian propositions.
There are reasons, even reasons internal to a popular view about Christian
faith, for denying that ﬁrst premise. No doubt, if the Christian story is true, then
God would want persons to have particular aﬀections toward God and others, to
engage in particular actions or kinds of actions, and to have particular beliefs,
including true ones about the main lines of Christianity, required to aid one in
living a faithful Christian life. But, it does not follow that God would want persons
to have epistemically justiﬁed beliefs with respect to Christian propositions.
Indeed, according to a leading notion of faith as it pertains to belief, belief by
faith goes beyond, so to speak, the evidence we have. According to this
view, which seems to be supported by various passages in scripture, it is a sign of
mature faith that one has conﬁdent belief about some matters even when the
evidence is not suitably impressive. The idea is that there is something religiously
valuable about having some beliefs that do not ﬁt with what one’s evidence
indicates.
In fact, there is a wide range of views about faith along this line. At one extreme
is the radical Kierkegaardian view (‘ I believe because it is absurd ’) ;24 according to
a popular interpretation, this view makes faith out to involve believing what is
plainly inconsistent with one’s evidence. Less radical (and, I think, more plausi
ble) views involve the idea that faith produces belief even when one’s evidence
with respect to the proposition believed no more indicates the truth of the
proposition than it indicates its falsity.25 Implicit in all such views is the idea that
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faith is valuable because it produces the kind of conﬁdence in the main lines of
Christianity that is not so sensitive to the vicissitudes of one’s ever-changing
evidence base ; and, partly for that reason, one’s living a life of faith – which cru
cially involves factors intimately related to one’s beliefs (e.g. one’s aﬀections,
desires, and actions) – need not be ruined by every epistemic challenge that
comes along. Accordingly, faith characteristically produces true beliefs that aid
one in living a good Christian life, but it does not follow that faith characteristi
cally produces epistemically justiﬁed belief. Such a view is thus consistent with
the thesis that faith characteristically produces true, but epistemically unjustiﬁed,
belief. Reﬂection on the religious plausibility of the view reveals that the SEO is
not committed to the falsity of Christian propositions ; for, even if the SEO proves
its conclusion, it is possible that Christian propositions are true. Hence, the SEO
is sensible when conjoined with the truth of Christian belief.
Why the SEO is worthy of philosophical interest

It is surely not obvious that the total evidence of sophisticated Christians
indicates the truth of Christian propositions. Long evidentialism is consistent
with the view that our psychologically basic perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs,
and a priori beliefs can be, and typically are, epistemically justiﬁed. But, it does
not follow that a psychologically basic Christian belief is epistemically justiﬁed. If
it is, then that will be partly, but crucially on long evidentialism, in virtue of a
person’s being in a non-inferential mental state that indicates the truth of the
relevant Christian proposition. So, to argue that such a state of aﬀairs obtains, one
needs to explain how a non-inferential mental state can indicate the truth of such
a proposition.
Although that is no easy task, another strikes me as even more diﬃcult : explain
why some putative defeaters for Christian propositions (or for the reasons
sophisticates have for believing such propositions) – that sophisticates are well
aware of – are not actual defeaters. Those worth taking seriously include some
arguments from evil, some arguments from religious (and non-religious) diver
sity, knowledge of epistemic peers who believe propositions inconsistent with
Christian propositions, and arguments for the conclusion that religious experi
ences are best explained not by the putative truth-makers of Christian prop
ositions but by non-supernatural causes. And, depending on how much rational
strength one’s objections have against the individual putative defeaters, one might
still need to explain why the totality of the putative defeaters do not constitute
epistemic defeat. On the other hand, if one attempts the strategy of arguing
that sophisticated Christians are justiﬁed in believing Christian propositions
on the basis of justiﬁed inferences, then one has the diﬃcult task of explaining
what sort of inferences are suﬃcient in light of knowledge of the putative
defeaters.26
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The so-what ? objection

If the conclusion of the SEO does not imply that Christians are blame
worthy for their Christian beliefs, and if it is plausible to understand religious
faith in such a way that believing against one’s evidence can be a virtue, then why
worry about the SEO ? Even if everything I have said is true, so what?27 Why should
sophisticated Christians be concerned about having doxastic attitudes that go
against their evidence?
What’s bad about believing against one’s evidence ?

Although I am not myself an evidentialist objector to the rationality of
Christian beliefs,28 I think that there are plausible evidentialist-friendly answers to
the so-what question. For one thing, believing what one’s evidence supports at a
time is necessary for having knowledge at that time, and knowledge is intrinsi
cally valuable ; so, by believing what one’s evidence does not support, one fails to
have something intrinsically valuable.
But, this is not a fully satisfactory answer to our question. One reason is that
one can fail to have knowledge even when one believes a proposition that one’s
total evidence massively (but not perfectly) supports.29 Another reason concerns
the doxastic attitude of suspending judgement. I take it that any plausible view of
epistemic rationality implies that suspending judgement can be the epistemically
rational attitude to take toward a proposition at a time. But one fails to have
knowledge every time one suspends judgement. Such considerations reveal a more
important reason that it is bad to believe against one’s evidence : doing so pre
vents one from having an epistemically rational attitude at the very time at issue.
Epistemic rationality is an evaluative concept, which has to do with satisfaction
of an intellectual standard at a time, a standard the satisfying of which constitutes
epistemic value with respect to rational enquiry at that time.30 That standard just
is having a doxastic attitude that is supported by one’s evidence. There is a simple
but powerful argument for this. ‘ Rational ’ means ‘of or based on reasoning or
reason ’.31 Although there are various kinds of reason, one has an epistemic reason
at a time only when one has an indication of the truth of a proposition at that
time. And any indication of the truth of a proposition to a person is very plausibly
some evidence the person has with respect to that proposition. So, epistemic
rationality at a time is a matter of one’s evidence that a proposition is true. In
failing to have the doxastic attitude that ﬁts one’s evidence at a time, one fails to
gain something of epistemic value.
Furthermore, intuitively the epistemic value of rationality is greater than the
epistemic value of truth. It is frequently said that lucky true beliefs are not par
ticularly valuable epistemically. Virtually everyone agrees that you are not doing
so well epistemically in luckily believing a truth : the common view is that you’re
doing much better epistemically by rationally believing. So, inasmuch as
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epistemic rationality at a time is a matter of believing what one’s evidence
supports at that time, believing against one’s evidence is a bad thing with respect
to what is plausibly the more valuable epistemic good.
So, believing what one’s evidence does not support exhibits a kind of intellec
tual failure. This is because, other things being equal, it is intellectually better to
have an epistemically rational doxastic attitude toward a proposition than an
epistemically irrational doxastic attitude. I take it that this is true regardless of
what plausibly explains ‘intellectually better ’.32 The upshot is that those who have
doxastic attitudes that do not ﬁt their evidence fail, with respect to those atti
tudes, to satisfy the standard of epistemic excellence that characterizes well-done
rational enquiry. That is what is bad about believing without, or against one’s,
evidence.
There may be a special reason that believing against one’s evidence is bad for
sophisticated Christians. St Anselm’s motto, ‘ Faith Seeking Understanding ’,
speaks to an aim of importance to typical sophisticated Christians, for it is also
the motto of the contemporary Society of Christian Philosophers. The phrase
contains ambiguities, but surely it is often taken to express a desire to discover
how the central Christian doctrines are consonant with the aim of rational en
quiry. Considered in light of much contemporary work in philosophical theology,
it is clear that ‘ faith seeking understanding ’ is often taken to express more than
merely understanding the meanings of Christian doctrines and relations among
them : it also involves understanding how religious belief is rational. On the
present proposal that the aim of rational enquiry involves believing in accordance
with one’s evidence, believing against one’s evidence can be in tension with
satisfying one’s goal of understanding one’s faith.
Epistemic rationality and blameworthiness

In any case, it does not follow that people who have doxastic attitudes that
go against their evidence deserve blame for those attitudes. The most funda
mental reason for this is that our doxastic attitudes are not under the kind of
direct voluntary control required for us to be responsible for them.33 We may well
have direct voluntary control over some of the actions that bear on which beliefs
we will have – paying close attention to our evidence, enacting policies about
virtuous evidence acquisition, and so on – but those are actions, not beliefs. One
might deserve praise or blame for such actions, but since one’s doxastic attitudes
are not under one’s immediate voluntary control, one does not deserve praise or
blame for them.
Another reason has to do with the way that one’s beliefs at a time can positively
aﬀect one’s future actions and future beliefs. It could be a contingent fact that one
will gain an epistemically rational (and perhaps prudentially or morally ben
eﬁcial) belief that q in the future only if one now believes a proposition p that is
not supported by one’s current total evidence. To extend an example by James
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(2003, 526), suppose that you are stuck on a mountainside in a blinding blizzard,
and you realize that you won’t survive the night by staying where you are.
Fumbling your way along a ledge, you come to an impassable wall. You consider
jumping, in the hope that you’ll land safely below and ﬁnd shelter, but you lack
the nerve to jump. So, you convince yourself, by means of a pep talk, to believe
p: I’ll land safely if I jump. However, since you have little or no indication that p is
true (and you remember that the general region you’re in is mostly sheer), your
total evidence doesn’t support p. Nevertheless, emboldened by your belief that p,
you jump, landing safely ten feet below, where you ﬁnd a cave that provides
shelter for the night. Next morning you wake up believing q: I’ve survived the
night and have a good chance of getting oﬀ the mountain alive, on the basis of
perception and your mountaineering knowledge.
So, here is a case in which you have an epistemically rational belief that q,
which you would not have had if you had not earlier believed p, which was not
then supported by your total evidence. It seems clear that you do not deserve
blame for believing p ; after all, had you not believed p, you would neither have
rationally believed q nor have survived. Reﬂection on examples like this reveals
that the kind of synchronic rationality that the SEO focuses on can have instru
mental value (or disvalue) for various kinds of diachronic rationality, epistemic
and otherwise.34
I think such considerations are signiﬁcant for right thinking about the kind of
belief that is involved in what is called religious faith. What I have said on behalf
of long evidentialism is consistent with the possibility that Christians’ irrationally
believing Christian propositions at some particular time will play a crucial
causal role in their rationally believing Christian propositions at a later
time. Perhaps this point is relevant to an aim expressed in ‘faith seeking under
standing’, for it is credible that some understanding comes only by way of prior
faith.35
Does this lessen philosophical interest in epistemic rationality at a time, which
the SEO focuses upon? I should think not. For even if Christians’ irrational beliefs
can have instrumental epistemic value with respect to some future beliefs, their
having synchronic epistemically rational beliefs whenever they do so will be in
virtue of their having evidence that, on balance, supports those propositions ;
and, this is precisely the feature that the SEO focuses on.
Still, given my view about faith, there can be times in a sophisticate’s life in
which two diﬀerent doxastic goods are at odds. For instance, one can have the
religious doxastic good of believing a proposition against one’s evidence and
thereby lack the epistemic good of believing in accord with one’s evidence, and
vice versa. So, even if a sophisticated Christian were convinced that the SEO is
successful, she might not be so worried about it because she thinks that she is
often gaining a more important good. The SEO is entirely neutral about that. But,
she might nevertheless ﬁnd troubling a question in the spirit of the SEO : what
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reason do you have to think that you are gaining a more important good by
believing against your evidence?

Conclusion

I conclude that Plantinga’s arguments on behalf of Reformed epistem
ology do not provide good reason to think that the SEO is improper ; thus, it is
philosophically worthwhile to consider whether the most plausible, fully articu
lated version of the SEO is a good objection to the epistemic rationality of
Christian belief. Such considerations will require much thought about the total
evidence sophisticated Christians have, and this will surely require much more
work than has been done about how religious experiences can provide evidential
support for Christian propositions.36 Perhaps, in the future, the objection will
be shown to be as futile as the Freud & Marx objection. But, is it not a proper
objection ?37
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Notes
1. That is, the SEO challenges whether sophisticated Christians have epistemic justiﬁcation for believing
Christian propositions, not whether sophisticates base their Christian beliefs on what yields epistemic
justiﬁcation.
2. The epistemic condition of the sophisticated contemporary religious believer is also a focal point of
Quinn (1985), (1993). See also Hasker (2001).
3. I have no precise analysis of the supports relation implied by the evidence-justiﬁcation principle, but
the basic idea is clear enough : if one has, say, more and better evidence indicating the truth of p at time
t than one has indicating yp, then one’s total evidence at t supports p ; and, if one has more and better
evidence indicating yp at t than one has indicating p, then one’s total evidence supports yp at t; and,
if one has no more and better evidence indicating p than one has indicating yp, then one’s total
evidence supports neither p nor yp at t.
4. This speciﬁcation of synchronic propositional justiﬁcation is consistent with formulations of leading
evidentialists. For instance, Richard Feldman : ‘The central idea of evidentialism can be stated in the
following evidentialist principle about justiﬁcation : EJ. Believing p is justiﬁed for S at t iﬀ S’s evidence at
t supports p ’ ; (2003), 45.
5. Why believe the evidence-justiﬁcation principle ? There are no uncontroversial counter-examples, and
one’s possessing evidence with respect to a proposition at a time seems to be the best explanation of
one’s being justiﬁed in the epistemic way in believing that proposition at that time; moreover, as Conee
(1992) argues, one’s possessing evidence is the best explanation of why the epistemic kind of justiﬁcation
is closely related to the truth of what is justiﬁed.
6. Mentalism (or ‘ mind internalism’) has two main theses : (1) a supervenience thesis (S) : ‘ The justiﬁcatory
status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the person’s occurrent and dispositional
mental states, events, and conditions’ ; and (2) a mental duplicates thesis (M) : ‘If any two possible
individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike justiﬁcationally, e.g., the same beliefs are
justiﬁed for them to the same extent’ ; Conee and Feldman (2004), 56.
7. The term ‘ long evidence ’ (and, by extension, ‘ long evidentialism ’) was coined by Steve Wykstra (on the
spot) at the 2007 Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference, to describe my broad and deep construal of
evidence.
8. Although beliefs very plausibly count among one’s internal mental states, beliefs count as supporting
evidence only insofar as the person’s reasons for belief, on balance, indicate the truth of the
propositions believed. It is plausible that one’s believing that p can be evidence for the proposition that
one believes that p; but, it does not follow, nor is it plausible, that one’s belief that p is evidence for p.
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9. See Kretzmann (1992). Others, who have argued that Plantinga’s anti-evidentialist arguments do not
apply to sensible versions of evidentialism, include Alston (1985), Wykstra (1989), and Timmons (1997).
10. Plantinga describes warrant as follows : ‘ the property enough of which distinguishes knowledge from
mere true belief, is a property or quantity had by a belief if and only if … that belief is produced by
cognitive faculties or processes functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according
to a design plan successfully aimed at truth ’ (2000), 204.
11. The Freud & Marx objection amounts to the claim that religious belief is irrational because ‘ religious
belief is not produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly and aimed at the truth ’
(Plantinga (2000), 152) but rather religious belief arises from wishful thinking in the interest of survival,
peace of mind, psychological well-being, and the like [Freud] or cognitive dysfunction produced by a
perverted social order [Marx].
12. Thus Plantinga concludes : ‘ There isn’t a sensible de jure objection or criticism that is independent of
the de facto question. There aren’t any de jure criticisms that are sensible when conjoined with the truth
of theistic belief ; all of them either fail right from the start (as with the claim that it is unjustiﬁed to
accept theistic belief) or else really presuppose that theism is false ’ ; (Plantinga (2000), 191).
13. Unfortunately, Plantinga does not oﬀer much detail about what properties these terms are supposed to
pick out.
14. So, take this paper as my ‘ homework ’ (see Plantinga (2000), 104, n. 60) defending the properness of a
de jure objection utilizing a view in the spirit of one of the most popular current theories of justiﬁcation.
15. For four representative publications spread over three decades, see Plantinga (1981), (1983), (1993b),
(2000).
16. See Conee & Feldman (2004), 61–64. See also the ‘ Epistemic rationality and blameworthiness’ section of
this paper.
17. This view is defended by Conee (1998).
18. Compare this to Bertrand Russell’s (2002), 88–90 view that a ‘ feeling of pastness ’ plays a crucial
epistemic role in memory knowledge.
19. Robert Audi speaks to the general nature of this view : ‘ some foundationalists tend to see experience as a
mirror of nature. This seems to some foundationalists a good, if limited, metaphor because it suggests at
least two important points : ﬁrst, that some experiences are produced by external states of the world,
somewhat as light produces mirror images ; and second, that (normally) the experiences in some way
match their causes, for instance in the color and shape one senses in one’s visual ﬁeld ’ ; (Audi (1993),
133).
20. See Long (2010), and idem ‘ Mentalism vindicated (and a super-blooper problem for proper function
justiﬁcation) ’ (unpublished), where I argue for a similar point in an objection to Michael Bergmann’s
(2006) claim that epistemic ﬁttingness is contingent on any cognizer’s design plan for belief formation.
21. A referee for this journal called attention to the following view: the experience of seeing a ﬂower
triggers the operation of what Plantinga calls the sensus divinitatis, which produces an experience of
the presence or greatness of God. On this view, the visual experience of the ﬂower causes – in those
whose sensus divinitatis is working properly – an experience indicating the truth of a theistic
proposition. I think this view is relevant for what we ultimately ought to think about the SEO, and I
intend to treat the issue in a subsequent paper. For now, I’ll make two points : First, the view depends
on the plausibility of thinking that there is a sensus divinitatis. It is unclear how one might argue for its
existence in a non-question-begging way, especially since only a minority of people would be inclined
to think that it exists. The problem applied to Christian propositions is harder, since an even smaller
minority would be inclined to think that there exists what Plantinga calls ‘ the internal instigation of the
Holy Spirit ’, which he says is the analogous process that produces Christian beliefs. Second, the
plausibility of the view as an objection to the SEO depends on the assumption that the putative
defeaters I discuss – in the ‘ Why the SEO is worthy of philosophical interest ’ section – are not actual
justiﬁcation defeaters.
22. I thank Justin McBrayer and Kenny Boyce, as well a journal referee, for pushing me to rethink this view.
23. For excellent discussions of this issue, see Conee (1998), and see Conee and Feldman (2004, 64–67).
24. Something along this line is a central theme in Kierkegaard (1974).
25. This view is somewhat suggested by arguments endorsed by William James (2003).
26. Plantinga (2000) is a notable proponent of the ﬁrst strategy. However, his responses to defeaters depend
on some arguments that are irrelevant to long evidentialism and others are not clearly relevant. So, more

393

394

T O D D R. L O N G

27.

28.

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.

37.

work is needed. Richard Swinburne (2003 ; 2004) is a notable proponent of the second strategy. Although
he has provided arguments suggesting what strike me as plausible ways to work toward such a project,
much more work is required on many details.
In this vein, Plantinga says : ‘ Many evidentialist objectors argue that theistic belief is irrational because
there is insuﬃcient evidence for it; they clearly think being irrational is a bad business ; but they seldom
say what’s bad about it. Instead, they move immediately to the task of showing, as they think, that there
is insuﬃcient evidence for belief in God. This prior question, nonetheless, remains crucial : insuﬃcient
for what? What is supposed to be bad about believing in the absence of evidence? ’ ; (2000), 86.
I am arguing only for the philosophical propriety of an evidentialist objection in light of the fact that it
isn’t obvious that the total evidence possessed by sophisticated Christians supports Christian
propositions.
For an excellent discussion of this point, see Feldman (2000), 682–686.
In virtue of what is there an intellectual standard of the sort I mention ? Candidates include Conee’s
(1992, 662–663) idea that it exists in virtue of our goal with respect to rational enquiry (i.e., knowing the
truth), Feldman’s (2000, 676) idea that the standard exists in virtue of our role as believers, Foley’s (1987)
idea that it exists in virtue of the cognitive goal we have to believe truths and not to believe falsehoods,
and Plantinga’s (1993a) idea that it exists in virtue of the kind of cognitive beings we are designed to be.
This is the ﬁrst deﬁnition of ‘ rational ’ in The Oxford English Reference Dictionary. See Pearsall &
Trumble (1996), 1198.
For candidate explanations of ‘ intellectually better ’, see note 30.
Many commentators have argued for this point, including Plantinga (1993b), 24.
Another reason to deny that believing against one’s evidence makes one deserving of blame concerns
the fact that there are various kinds of rationality, including prudential rationality. One and the same
belief could satisfy one standard without satisfying another. See Cohen (1984), 279–280 ; Conee (1992),
658–659 ; 667–668 ; and Feldman (2003), 43–45.
William James (2003, 524) oﬀers reasons that provide support for this view.
William Alston (1991) discusses, in the last chapter, the various grounds for religious belief that I think
are salient for providing an adequate rebuttal of the SEO. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that more work
needs to be done. Some problems for such a project are raised by various authors in a special edition
on the epistemology of religious experience in Faith and Philosophy, 22 : 4 (October 2005).
I thank E. J. Coﬀman, Timothy McGrew, Alvin Plantinga, Michael Rea, and Stephen Wykstra for helpful
comments on early drafts. I also thank Keith Abney, Andrei Buckareﬀ, Earl Conee, Stephen Evans,
Richard Feldman, Thomas Flint, Jonathan Kvanvig, Justin McBrayer, Nathan Nobis, Thomas Senor,
several referees, as well as participants in the 2007 Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference, for helpful
comments concerning ideas in later drafts. Research for this paper was funded in part by a Postdoctoral
Fellowship in The Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame (2003–2004) and a
Junior Faculty Support Grant from the College of Liberal Arts at California Polytechnic State University
(2006).

